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In early 2007, the newly minted Copyright Royalty Board
(CRB) handed down its first ruling, which set royalty rates for the
digital performance of sound recordings.1 The CRB's ruling ignited a
firestorm of concern among Internet radio broadcasters (webcasters)
and their listeners.2 For some webcasters, the change to royalty rates
constituted a 300-1200% increase over what was due under the
previous scheme.3 This massive increase in royalties is attributable to
the willing buyer/willing seller standard that the CRB is statutorily
required to employ.4 This standard directs the CRB to construct one
hypothetical marketplace and establish rates to which most buyers
and sellers in the marketplace would agree.
5
The resulting royalties will put many webcasters out of
business and hinder the growth of a new, evolving industry. 6 This
effect runs counter to the purpose of copyright law, which is to
encourage creative output for the public good by awarding temporary
monopoly rights to those who produce creative works. 7 For this
reason, 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B) must be amended to direct the CRB to
apply the willing buyer/willing seller standard in a manner that
adequately accounts for the varied financial realities facing
webcasters and honors the overarching policy of copyright law.
This article argues for a standard that expressly directs the
CRB to construct a hypothetical marketplace for each actual
marketplace. Part I discusses the CRB's application of the willing
buyer/willing seller standard. Part II analyzes the shortcomings of
the current standard and proposes a revised standard that accounts
for the economic realities of the webcasting industry while honoring
the objectives of copyright law.
1. See Susan Butler, Inside the Copyright Royalty Board: Chief Judge James
Sledge Explains the CRB Process, BILLBOARD, Oct. 20, 2007, at 28.
2. See Shaun Assael, Online and on the Edge, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2007, at 2(32);
Robert Levine, A Fee Per Song Can Ruin Us, Internet Radio Companies Say, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 19, 2007, at C4.
3. Jay Inslee, Rep., Lawmakers Hope to Prevent Demise of Internet Radio (Apr.
26, 2007), http://www.house.gov/inslee/issues/technology/saving-internetradio.html.
4. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B) (2000 & Supp. V 2005); Digital Performance Right
in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,086 (Copyright
Royalty Bd. May 1, 2007) (final rule and order).
5. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B); Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings
and Ephemeral Recordings, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,086.
6. See Inslee, supra note 3.
7. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); Bond v.
Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 393 (4th Cir. 2003).
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I. THE COPYRIGHT ROYALTY BOARD'S APPLICATION OF THE WILLING
BUYER/WILLING SELLER STANDARD AND THE RESULTING ROYALTY
RATES
When webcasters and copyright owners fail to agree on a
negotiated royalty rate, § 114(f)(2)(B) directs the CRB to "establish
rates and terms that most clearly represent the rates and terms that
would have been negotiated in the marketplace between a willing
buyer and a willing seller."8  The CRB must base "its decision on
economic, competitive and programming information presented by the
parties."9 Additional considerations include the extent to which the
copyrighted use will drive or interfere with record sales and the
relative roles of the copyright licensor and licensee in bringing the
copyrighted work to the public. 10 The latter factors, while specifically
set out in subsections of the statute, do not warrant greater weight.11
After webcasters and copyright owners failed to negotiate
binding rates, the CRB began its rate determination procedure.1 2 To
apply the willing buyer/willing seller standard, the CRB first
constructed the hypothetical marketplace in which the "buyers" and
"sellers" would arrive at a negotiated price for the "product."13 The
CRB defined the "buyers" as the services (webcasters) in a market
where no compulsory license exists. 14 The CRB defined "sellers" as
record companies under no compulsion to sell their product and the
"product" as a blanket license for the sellers' complete repertoire.1 5
Notably, the CRB acknowledged there would be "significant
variations, among both buyers and sellers, in terms of sophistication,
economic resources, business exigencies, and myriad other factors" in
the hypothetical marketplace created1 6  However, the ultimate
resolution of these "significant" differences was the establishment of
rates to which most buyers and sellers would agree.' 7 The CRB
offered as justification for this homogenous treatment of the services'
8. 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B).
9. Id.
10. Id. § 114(f)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).
11. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 72
Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,087 (Copyright Royalty Bd. May 1, 2007) (final rule and order).
12. Id. at 24,084.
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broad interests the observation that "the Copyright Royalty Judges
cannot guarantee a profitable business to every market entrant."18
The result is a rate scheme that does not adequately account
for the disparate, nuanced financial realities of an evolving industry.
Instead, all webcasters are subject to the same per-performance
royalty metric, 19 and many will crumble under the weight of the rate
increase. 20
II. THE SINGLE HYPOTHETICAL MARKETPLACE STANDARD LEADS TO
DISRUPTIVE, COST-PROHIBITIVE ROYALTIES THAT UNDERMINE
COPYRIGHT LAW'S PURPOSE
A. Webcasters May Be Victims of Their Own Success
A rate determination method that drives successful members of
the effected class out of business patently runs counter to copyright
law objectives. 21 The effect will limit public access to creative works
and stifle the creative spirit of an evolving industry. Pandora's
dilemma illustrates this point.
At the heart of Pandora's webcasting service is the Music
Genome Project.22 Company analysts break down songs to their
foundational melodic, rhythmic, and harmonic components. 23 These
characteristics are then entered into a database from which the
company's software creates personalized stations tailored to individual
listeners by matching the characteristics of that listener's musical
preferences to its library of musical "elements."24  After years of
fighting to create a profitable innovation-based business, Pandora is
finally poised to turn a profit. 25 However, the new royalty rates will
swallow seventy percent of Pandora's income, 26 and it will become a
victim of its own success.
18. Id. at 24,089 n.8.
19. Id. at 24,095.
20. See Levine, supra note 2.
21. See Press Release, SaveNetRadio Coalition, Proposal Would Decimate Internet
Radio Industry (May 22, 2007), http://www.savenetradio.org/press room/press-releases/
070522-rejection.pdf.
22. Pandora, About Pandora, http://pandora.com/corporate/index.shtml (last visited
Mar. 9, 2008).
23. William Brand, Pandora.corn in Oakland a Top Internet Radio Station, INSIDE





It is not the purpose of copyright law to erase successful,
innovative businesses from the commercial landscape. To the
contrary, § 801(b)(1)(D) states that rates should be determined in a
manner that "minimize[s] any disruptive impact on the structure of
the industries involved. ' 27 Plainly, the opposite has occurred here,
and the willing buyer/willing seller standard failed to yield a
hypothetical marketplace reflective of copyright law objectives.
B. The New Royalty Rates Punish Authors of Creative Works and the
Consuming Public
The Internet provides artists with direct artist-to-consumer
distribution in a way unavailable to most artists through traditional
media outlets.28 This is particularly true for musicians whose music
does not fit within genres that dominate terrestrial radio, such as the
band Milkshake. 29
Milkshake creates children's music. 30 Where terrestrial radio
play is not an option, the Internet provides the most democratic of
channels of distribution for the band's music. 31 Lisa Mathews, a
founding member of the band, put it this way: 'When it comes to
radio, there just aren't many venues for Children's Music via the
traditional radio stations. Webcasters provide an outlet for kids and
parents to hear new music-music that is pretty much ignored by
traditional radio. For me the value is undeniable.
'"' 32
As the royalty rate increase drives webcasters out of business,
the industry will be reduced to fewer distribution options for artists
like Milkshake. Webcasting, as a business, will be viable only for a
limited class of webcasters. This, in turn, will constrict artists' access
to streaming opportunities and lead to a reduction in the amount and
variety of creative works available to the public. Again, this runs
27. 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1)(D) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
28. See Cortney Harding, The Billboard Q&A: Trent Reznor & Saul Williams,
BILLBOARD, Nov. 10, 2007, at 23 (discussing Reznor's decision to release his album online
in a manner similar to Radiohead).
29. See Press Release, SaveNetRadio Coalition, Wyden-Brownback "Internet Radio




31. See Inslee, supra note 3.
32. Press Release, SaveNetRadio Coalition, Wyden-Brownback "Internet Radio
Equality Act" Introduced in the Senate, supra note 29 (quoting Lisa Mathews, member of
the band Milkshake).
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afoul of copyright's driving principle-to increase public access to
creative works by rewarding authors with royalties. 33
Unfortunately, the willing buyer/willing seller standard yielded
royalty rates that will punish successful webcasters,3 4 limit industry
growth, 35 and stifle new-media innovation such as the Music Genome
Project. 36 Moreover, the result will harm those whom the rates are
intended to benefit-copyright owners and the public.37
III. IN THE INTEREST OF ADVANCING COPYRIGHT POLICY, THE CRB
MUST APPLY A STANDARD THAT EXPRESSLY ACCOUNTS FOR
WEBCASTERS' VARIED FINANCIAL REALITIES
The willing buyer/willing seller standard's primary deficiency
is its failure to account for individualized financial realities in the
marketplace adequately. 38 However, this deficiency would be cured if
§ 114(f)(2)(B) mandated construction of a hypothetical marketplace for
each actual market, rather than clumsily corralling all webcasters into
one less representative marketplace. Furthermore, delineating
market participants in a manner consistent with the financial realities
of the marketplace would bring the CRB's rate determination process
in line with the fair income for copyright users that § 801(b)(1) calls
for, 39 and minimize the "disruptive impact on the structure of the
industries involved."40
Section 114(f)(2)(B) should be amended to direct the CRB to
construct as many hypothetical marketplaces as the financial realities
of the actual marketplace support. To make this determination, the
CRB should consider: (1) the revenue derived from the use of
copyrighted works; (2) webcasters' individual business models,
including their commercial motives; (3) the level at which individual
webcasters reach the public; and (4) the volume of use of copyrighted
works. Additionally, the two statutory factors set forth in §
114(f)(2)(B)-whether the use of the copyrighted work stimulates or
33. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
34. See Brand, supra note 23.
35. See Press Release, SaveNetRadio Coalition, Proposal Would Decimate Internet
Radio Industry, supra note 21.
36. See Brand, supra note 23.
37. See Press Release, SaveNetRadio. Coalition, Wyden-Brownback "Internet Radio
Equality Act" Introduced in the Senate, supra note 29.
38. See Internet Radio Equality Act, H.R. 2060, 110th Cong. (2007); Digital
Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084
(Copyright Royalty Bd. May 1, 2007) (final rule and order).
39. See 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1)(B) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
40. Id. § 801(b)(1)(D).
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hinders sale of the work, and the relative roles of the copyright owner
and user in terms of risk, creative and technological contribution, and
investment 41-should be analyzed in conjunction with the previous
four factors. These six factors certainly will overlap, and none should
be determinative. The CRB should analyze each factor in the context
of the others and weight the factors on a case-by-case basis as the
CRB deems appropriate.
A. Webcaster Revenue Substantially Attributable to Streaming of
Copyrighted Works
Webcasters primarily generate revenue through some
combination of subscriptions, 42 donations,
43 and advertising sales.44
The CRB must determine to what extent a webcaster's revenue is
substantially attributable to the streaming of copyrighted works. In
the simplest of cases, webcasters like Atlantic Sound Factory,
operated by one person as a hobby, derive revenue only from
donations. 45 These donations are substantially attributable to the
streaming service; however, as mentioned below, the profit motive is
lacking.46 Clearly, as a webcaster's revenue streams increase, the
attribution of revenue to the use of copyrighted works will become
more sophisticated. For example, Yahoo! is a publicly traded company
tallying revenue in the billions of dollars, and Internet streaming
constitutes only a portion of that revenue.
47
B. Webcasters'Business Models and Commercial Motives
This factor would require the CRB to inquire into the
webcasters' fundamental commercial purpose. To make this
determination, the CRB should consider the business's organizational
41. 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
42. See Live365.com, VIP Membership Agreement, https:H/store.live365.comlorders/
orderform-listen.live (follow 'Membership Agreement" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 9, 2008)
(stating Live365.com will remove all advertisements from use of the service for paid VIP
Members).
43. See Assael, supra note 2.
44. See Miguel Helft, AOL Moving To Increase Revenue It Gets from Search Ads,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2007, at C2 (discussing AOL's efforts to increase advertising revenue to
off-set its decision to waive subscription fees for many services and offer them for free).
45. See Assael, supra note 2.
46. Id.
47. See Press Release, Yahoo!, Yahoo! Reports Third Quarter 2007 Financial
Results (Oct. 16, 2007), http://files.shareholder.com/downloadsYHOO/256133812x0x
137473/fa47ff82-92f7-448f-8e28-2a66f8abd5dfYHOOQ3FY07PRFinal.pdf.
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structures, its commercial motive, whether the business offers other
services, the manner in which revenue is generated, and any other
relevant considerations. At its core, this factor probes whether the
company seeks to profit from the use of copyrighted works.
C. Volume of Use of Copyrighted Works and the Scope of the Audience
As an audience is a prerequisite to use of copyrighted works in
this context, these two factors are linked. Together they provide a
safeguard for copyright owners. The analysis here would focus on the
number of copyrighted works a webcaster streams and the number of
listeners that utilize a particular webcaster's streaming service.
A high volume of use of copyrighted works may suggest a
significant reliance on streaming as a revenue-generating service. As
a webcaster's reliance on the use of copyrighted works for revenue
increases, the potential for unfair exploitation rises. In this way,
these factors will further inform the CRB's analysis of the webcaster
revenue and business model factors. Overall, the volume of use and
audience scope factors will favor an equitable balance by precluding
large webcasters from availing themselves of rates established for a
hypothetical marketplace designed for lower volume webcasters.
D. The Existing Statutory Factors
Finally, the CRB should consider the two statutory factors set
forth in § 114(f)(2)(B). First, § 114(f)(2)(B)(i) identifies as a relevant
consideration whether streaming will hinder or enhance copyright
owners' other revenue sources. 48 Second, the CRB should consider the
§ 1 14(f)(2)(B)(ii) factor: the relative share of the risk, capital
investment, cost, and creative and technological contribution of the
copyright owner versus the user.49 In this analysis, technological
innovations akin to the Music Genome Project would warrant
consideration. 50
E. Determining Royalty Rates for the Hypothetical Marketplaces in
Accord with the Objectives of Copyright Law
After analyzing the factors set forth above, the CRB should
establish the appropriate number of hypothetical marketplaces and
48. 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B)(i) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
49. Id. § 114(f)(2)(B)(ii).
50. See Pandora, About Pandora, supra note 22.
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classify webcasters accordingly. At this point, the primary deficiency
of the current standard would be cured, and the CRB would create, for
each hypothetical market, a rate scheme that the relevant market
participants would arrive at on the open market. It is not the purpose
of the proposed standard to influence what form the resulting royalty
scheme takes. Rather, the extent of the proposed standard's control
over the remainder of the process is only to require that the rates be
arrived at in accord with, and be reflective of, the objectives set forth
in § 801(b)(1)-the CRB must seek a fair return for copyright owners,
seek a fair income for copyright users, maximize the public's access,
and minimize the effect on the industry.
IV. CONCLUSION
The current manifestation of the willing buyer/willing seller
standard has the Internet radio industry operating under the threat of
a debilitating royalty increase. 51 This poses a serious risk to the
viability of webcasting as an industry, which in turn will decrease
public access to creative works and constrict avenues of exposure and
royalty revenue for copyright owners. These results are contrary to
the purpose of copyright law.
5 2
To bring the royalties in line with this purpose, § 114(f)(2)(B)
must be amended to direct the CRB to establish as many hypothetical
marketplaces as the financial realities of the actual market dictate.
Additionally, the statute should require the CRB to determine the
appropriate nature and quantity of hypothetical marketplaces by
analyzing the six factors discussed above.
Amending the standard in this way would result in a royalty
scheme reflective of copyright law objectives by minimizing the
disruptive impact on Internet radio's evolution while enabling a fair
return for copyright owners and a fair income for copyright users.
53
Similarly, and perhaps most importantly, the public would continue to
benefit as diverse webcasters, such as Atlantic Sound Factory and
Pandora, continue to give form to Internet radio as an emerging
engine of access to creative works.
51. See Inslee, supra note 3.
52. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); Bond v.
Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 393 (4th Cir. 2003).
53. See 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
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